Why is the cost of resolving insurance company failures so high? Evidence in this article suggests that the state insurance regulatory bodies in charge of the liquidation process turn over an average of only $0.33 for each $1.00 of pre-insolvency assets to the guaranty funds (the state agencies responsible for paying claims). This very low "recovery rate" could result from ex ante regulatory failure-the assets of the company are not worth much, reflecting regulatory problems before liquidation. Alternatively, the low recovery rate could reflect ex post regulatory failure-a regulatory version of the "free cash flow" theory (Jensen, 1986) . In this latter case, cash-rich liquidators, who pay their own expenses out of the liquidation receipts first, are reluctant to turn over the money from asset sales to the guaranty funds. The evidence suggests that the low recovery rates arise from both types of regulatory failure.
INTRODUCTION
Evidence in this article suggests that the total cost of resolving property-casualty (P&C) insurance company insolvencies is quite high. The net cost of resolving insolvencies (net of "recoveries" from asset sales), which are ultimately paid for by "assessments" levied against nonfailed firms, is approximately $1.22 for each $1.00 of pre-insolvency assets. This estimate is even higher than a previous estimate 1 and is nearly four times higher than estimates of the costs of resolving bank failures.
2 Why are insurance company failures so costly to resolve?
The evidence in this article points to a surprising answer. Given the high risk of P&C liabilities relative to their assets (mostly bonds and other "hard" assets), it seemed reasonable to guess that the costliness of P&C failures was driven by huge increases in claims (from disasters, large liability claims, etc.), perhaps driven by moral hazard considerations.
3 That is, it seemed likely to be a liability rather than an asset problem. Although this may be a significant part of the answer, the more surprising result is that liquidators recover so little from the asset sales of the failed companies. This low recovery rate is an important reason for net costs being so high. The evidence suggests a recovery rate of only 33 percent. That is, for every $1.00 of assets taken over by state regulators, liquidators turn over an average of only $0.33 to the "state guaranty funds," the state organizations responsible for paying the claims of the failed companies. As a percentage of "hard assets"-invested assets such as cash, stocks, and bonds-the recovery rate is only slightly higher, about 41 percent.
The low recovery rate suggests regulatory failure of some sort. One possibility is ex ante regulatory failure: the problems arise before the liquidation process. Liquidators recover so little because the assets are essentially worthless, reflecting regulatory breakdown before the liquidation process. Another possibility is ex post regulatory failure: the liquidation process is flawed. When the liquidators sell off the assets, they pay their own expenses first, before turning over the proceeds to the guaranty funds. Thus, with first priority, liquidators do not have strong incentives to maximize proceeds from asset sales; nor do they have strong incentives to terminate the liquidation proceedings efficiently and quickly. Indeed, selling off assets can be a continuous source of cash flow to the liquidators and regulatory agencies who oversee the liquidation process. This view is a regulatory version of Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory, which states that agency problems are exacerbated by large amounts of free cash flow. Just as managers with lots of cash are reluctant to return this money to shareholders, regulators with lots of cash are less than eager to return this money to guaranty funds. State liquidators prefer to use this money on "expenses" that confer private benefits rather than turn the money over to guaranty funds.
This article provides background information on the rules and organization of the guaranty fund system and develops an agency theoretic framework for analyzing the incentives created by P&C solvency regulation. The article then describes the data and produces estimates of the total net costs of resolving P&C insurance company failures. Separate estimates are produced for guaranty fund payments and asset recoveries, since net costs equal the difference between these two. The article explores the relationship among regulatory resources, regulatory regimes, and recovery rates. The author addresses the issue of how much of the low recovery rate can be explained by ex ante regulatory failure and how much can be explained by ex post regulatory failure. The author looks for evidence that explains why guaranty fund payment rates are so high. The article includes a discussion of the policy relevance of the findings before the summary and conclusion.
P&C SOLVENCY REGULATION: AN AGENCY FRAMEWORK
This section provides background information on the rules and organization of the guaranty fund system, 4 which is followed by an agency theoretic analysis of the incentives created by this system.
Rules and Organization
Property and casualty (P&C) insurance companies are regulated at the state level. In the late 1960s, the federal government threatened to establish a federally operated insurance system for policyholders similar to the insurance system for bank depositors called the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The threat of federal intrusion into an industry regulated by the states pushed the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to propose model legislation that established guaranty funds at the state level. The states quickly enacted legislation that established state guaranty funds, and the organization of the funds generally followed that of the NAIC's Model Act. By 1971, more than two-thirds of the states had established guaranty funds, with all of the other states following by 1982.
Guaranty funds are nonprofit associations consisting of all companies licensed to write insurance in a particular state (in lines covered by the guaranty fund). Insurance companies are required by law to be a part of the state's guaranty fund system. The guaranty funds are governed by boards composed of insurance company representatives and representatives from the state insurance commissioner's office.
State guaranty funds are distinct from state insurance departments, which are responsible for the detection and prevention of insurance company insolvencies. Once the state court has deemed an insurance company to be insolvent, the state insurance department takes over the company. Rehabilitations are rare, although evidence by BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) suggests that regulators are sometimes successful in facilitating mergers of financially weak companies into healthier ones. The state insurance department turns over the claim files of the insolvent company to the guaranty fund, which then pays the claims of the policyholders in the same way that such claims would be paid by solvent insurance companies. Guaranty funds pay the full amount of an insured's claims up to a certain cap, except for a small deductible that ranges from $0 to $200. The cap on the funds' liability per claim is typically in the range of $300,000 to $500,000, although some states maintain caps as low as $100,000. While the guaranty fund pays most of the claims of the failed insurance companies, the liquidators (which are typically appointed by, or a part of, the state regulator's office) are in charge of selling off the assets of the failed insurance companies. The liquidators use the proceeds of the asset sales to pay their own expenses (e.g., those expenses associated with the liquidation proceedings). Then, after paying any employee wages 5 and taxes that are owed, the liquidators turn over the remaining funds from the asset sales, which are called "recoveries," to the guaranty funds. All other creditors, including claimants not covered by the guaranty funds, have last priority in the distribution process, which typically means that they receive nothing (since recoveries are not usually large enough to cover guaranty fund payments).
Because the recoveries from asset sales typically fall short of the money the guaranty funds need to pay policyholders (called "payments"), the guaranty funds make up the shortfall between payments and recoveries by levying assessments against the healthy insurance companies operating in the state. The size of an assessment is proportional to the company's share of direct premiums written in the state.
6 Thus, assessments are not risk based. Guaranty funds also levy assessments to cover their own administrative and legal expenses associated with their operations.
In 49 states, guaranty funds operate on a post-assessment basis. (The exception is New York.)
7 Thus, the guaranty funds are not really funds since they maintain no reserves and assess member insurers only after an insolvency occurs. Assessments are typically capped at 2 percent of premiums written per year, although some states maintain lower caps (NCIGF, 1997).
Agency Theory Framework
A schematic of the people and organizations involved in solvency regulation is contained in Figure 1 . Importantly, the arrows indicate the flow of funds between the groups. When an insolvency occurs, the guaranty funds make the payments to the policyholders. Guaranty funds receive their funds from the state-regulator-appointed liquidators who sell the assets. After paying their own expenses, including their own salaries, the liquidators turn over recoveries to the guaranty funds. The shortfall, which will be substantial in most cases, is made up by assessments, which flow from the solvent insurance companies to the guaranty funds. Although insurance companies actually pay the assessments, their cost is borne by insurance companies and two other parties: (1) policyholders (since insurers are allowed to include the cost of assessments as a factor in determining premium rates) and (2) taxpayers (since some states allow insurance companies to use assessments as credits, or "tax offsets," against premium taxes).
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The incentive misalignments in this system can be analyzed in a straightforward manner through the lens of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , which is the starting point for most economic analyses of organizational incentives and behavior. Agency problems are caused by incentive misalignment between principals and agents. From an agency perspective, three main characteristics about solvency regulation suggest potential problems. First, the principals are a diffuse combination of insurance companies, taxpayers, and policyholders (those who bear the assessment costs), all of which, in turn, comprise thousands of individuals/groups themselves. 6 More specifically, the assessments are based on the proportion of premiums in a specific line within the state. Many guaranty funds are organized into separate accounts covering broad lines of insurance. Typically, a guaranty fund has three separate accounts-workers compensation, automobile, and "all other" types of insurance. However, different states operate as few as one or as many as six different accounts. 7 New York operates on a pre-assessment basis. The state maintains a fund of $150 to $200 million for the resolution of insurance failures. Firms writing insurance in the state are assessed whenever the fund balance falls below the lower bound. 8 See Barrese and Nelson (1994) for an analysis of who bears assessment taxes. Under such circumstances, any one individual has limited incentives (because of the free-rider problem) to ensure that the solvency regulatory system operates efficiently. In addition, the fact that it requires complicated academic studies to determine the incidence of the assessment tax suggests that it is difficult to identify the principals. That is, not only is each group of principals diffuse, but the groups themselves may not fully understand the degree to which they are principals.
Second, it is not clear that the two agents (the state regulators and the guaranty funds) have incentives that are aligned with each other or with the principals. The boards of the guaranty funds comprise both representatives of the industry and the state regulatory agencies. Although the industry pressures the guaranty funds to keep assessments low, the guaranty funds do not have control over solvency regulation or the asset liquidation process, which vastly limits their ability to keep assessments at an efficiently low level. These duties fall to the state regulatory agencies, whose commissioners have different incentives because they are accountable to a different group-taxpayer citizens in the case of election and the governor in the case of political appointment.
Third, and perhaps most important, the separation of the duties and accountabilities between the two agents-guaranty funds and state regulators (who in turn appoint liquidators)-is especially problematic from an agency perspective because such a system leaves all of the proceeds of the asset sales in the hands of a group (liquidators) with virtually no liabilities other than its own expenses. This has the potential to create a regulatory version of Jensen's (1986) free cash flow problem. Evidence from the corporate finance literature suggests that agency problems are most severe when corporate managers have substantial free cash flow (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Additionally, just as corporate executives are reluctant to turn over profits to shareholders under such conditions, liquidators may be reluctant to part with the money generated from asset sales. Indeed, the free cash flow problem may be even worse in regulatory agencies, given the opportunities for rent-seeking and opportunistic behavior by politicians and government employees. 
Payments
This analysis raises several important questions. First, how large are the net costs of insolvencies? The degree of the agency problem is directly related to the size of the costs of resolving insolvencies. Second, what drives these costs? High costs can be driven by ex ante regulatory failure (poor regulation before the insolvency resolution process) or ex post regulatory failure (the free cash flow problem inherent in the liquidation process). Third, do certain regulatory characteristics mimimize the agency problems associated with the regulatory process? For example, one might expect elected commissioners, who are arguably more accountable to taxpayers, to be more efficient regulators than appointed commissioners. This article explores the empirical relevance of these important issues.
THE COST OF INSOLVENCIES
This section first describes the data and then produces estimates of the total cost of resolving P&C insurance company failures. The cost estimates are total costs, net of recoveries from asset sales, scaled by the size of the company measured by pre-insolvency assets.
Data Description
The cost data in this study come from the National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds ' Assessment and Financial Information Reports (NCIGF, 1992 , 1993 . The reports produce cumulative and annual payments, recoveries, and net cost data for each P&C insurance company insolvency that triggered guaranty fund payments since 1969. Payments are made by the guaranty funds to claimants, and recoveries represent funds turned over by the liquidators from the proceeds of asset sales. Net costs are the difference between payments and recoveries and represent the total costs of resolving an insolvency. Thus, except for differences in timing, the net cost of an insolvency is equal to the total amount of assessments levied against healthy firms for that insolvency.
Liquidation dates for each insolvency were found in Best's Insurance Reports, in Best's Solvency Report, in documents provided by the NCIGF, or, as a last resort, by newspaper searches in Lexis-Nexis. The financial data for each firm were obtained from the NAIC Annual Statement Database. The data for each firm were drawn from the annual statement filed by the firm in the year before failure (and in some cases, which are noted, two years before failure). Because the NAIC machine-readable financial data are not available for years before 1984, the analysis was confined to firms that failed after 1986. 9 A small number of (mostly very small) firms were excluded from the sample because the author could not find liquidation dates or because financial data were not available. The final data set includes 154 insolvencies representing about 80 percent of guaranty fund payments. All financial and cost data were adjusted for inflation using the CPI. New York was excluded from the analysis because it did not submit data to the NCIGF for two of the three reports.
10 Summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical tests that follow are included in Table 1 . 
Measuring Net Costs
In an earlier work, Bohn and Hall (1998) showed that the net cost of resolving insolvencies, scaled by size, was very high-approximately $1.00 of net costs for every $1.00 of (pre-insolvency) assets. The Bohn-Hall method used annual net-cost numbers and premium information to estimate typical net-cost time paths, which was then combined with cumulative net costs and assets to produce net cost-to-asset ratios. Although this method has its advantages, it has the problem of using relatively noisy annual net cost numbers and volatile premium numbers 11 to produce the costto-asset estimates.
This study attempts to improve on these estimates in two ways. First, a different, simpler methodology is used that does not rely on the annual cost or premium data. Instead, only cumulative cost data, which averages out year-to-year fluctuations, are used to produce the estimates. Second, the data are updated to include net costs from the NCIGF's 1995 report, which has cost data for 1994.
Costs are measured as a percentage of pre-insolvency assets because the scale of insolvency costs is hard to interpret unless measured against a benchmark. To be precise, the insolvency costs to asset ratio is defined as: Bohn and Hall (1999) show that pre-insolvency premium growth can be very volatile.
where P is equal to all Guaranty Fund loss payments 12 and R equals net recoveries made by the liquidators. Net recoveries are defined as
, where b is equal to the percentage of assets that are "bad," or unrecoverable, and d is equal to the percentage of assets that are "destroyed" in the liquidation process because of inefficient liquidation proceedings. Inefficient proceedings (a high d) result from liquidators receiving low prices on asset sales or from high liquidator expenses. Unfortunately, liquidator expenses are not publicly available, so it is not possible to pinpoint the source of any inefficiencies in the liquidation process. In addition to estimating the magnitude of C/A, much of the analysis that follows centers on distinguishing between high b (ex ante regulatory failure) and high d (ex post regulatory failure).
The most straightforward method for calculating total cost-to-asset ratios is simply to divide the cumulative costs for each insolvency by pre-insolvency assets. 13 The problem with this method is that insolvencies take time to resolve. That is, the payments and the recoveries occur over time, implying that cumulative costs in a specific year do not necessarily represent the total resolution costs of the insolvency. Thus, to determine average cost-to-asset ratios and the pattern of these costs over time, the cumulative net cost-to-asset ratio is regressed on a set of time dummies. For example, the Year 1 time dummy represents the average cumulative cost-to-asset ratio for all firms that failed one year ago, and the Year 2 dummy is the ratio for firms that failed two years ago, etc.
14 The results are reported in the first column of Table 2. 15 Each coefficient represents the average cumulative cost-to-asset ratio for each time period. White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses and are shown below the coefficients, which is the case for all of the regressions that follow. Although uneven from estimating a time path from cross-sectional data, the costs rise over time, showing a rough time pattern of costs. The results indicate that cumulative costs rise over time from Year 1 to Year 3. No such pattern emerges in years that follow, where the cost-to-asset ratio fluctuates around an average slightly above one. That costs do not rise in the years after Year 3 suggests that it is reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of net costs occur in the first four years. This is not too far from the net-cost time-path estimate of Bohn and Hall (1998) , who found that about 82 percent of net costs are realized in the first four years. 16 The bottom row is the mean of the net cost-to-asset ratio for all insolvencies that occurred at least four years before the end date (1994) . The numbers in the bottom row represent estimates of total resolution costs, assuming that all costs occur in the first four years following insolvency. The estimated cost-to-asset ratio is 1.22, which is about 20 percent higher than the Bohn and Hall estimate.
For the sake of comparison, it is also instructive to produce cost estimates that are conceptually similar to those of Bohn and Hall. To do this, each cumulative cost estimate for firms that failed at least four years ago is scaled according to the Bohn and Hall estimate of the time path. For example, since the estimated time path implies that 82 percent of the costs are resolved by Year 4, each net-cost figure for Year 4 is scaled up by 1/.82. That is, there is an "add-on" cost of 0.22 for Year 4 firms and a smaller add-on cost for Year 5 firms, etc., which declines over time according to Bohn and Hall's estimated time path. After the net-cost data are adjusted in this way, analogous net-cost regressions are run, which are shown in the second and third columns of Table 2 . Likewise, the mean is shown in the last row. Using this procedure, the estimate of the net cost-to-asset ratio is 1.38. Add-on costs include "projected future costs." The procedure for making such projections is explained in the text and in Bohn and Hall (1998) .
These results corroborate the finding of Bohn and Hall that the total costs of resolving insolvencies are quite high. In fact, using this more straightforward methodology (along with the updated data) produces a slightly higher estimate of the resolution cost-to-asset ratio. The more conservative estimate, which seems reasonable given the time path of cumulative costs, suggests that total resolution costs are approximately $1.22 per $1.00 of pre-insolvency assets. Allowing for add-on adjustments, the cost-to-asset estimate is even higher.
Recoveries and Payments
The key question raised by this finding is why net costs are so high. To shed light on this issue, it is necessary to distinguish between two possibilities: either the liquidators (who are responsible for selling off the assets) are turning over little money to the guaranty funds, or the guaranty funds (who are responsible for paying claimants) are paying huge sums to claimants. (A third possibility is that some combination of the two is occurring.) In this section, the time path of recoveries and payments are examined separately to help answer this question.
Recoveries
In the first column of Table 3 , the time path of cumulative recoveries is shown. The ratio of recoveries to assets is regressed on time dummies in a manner analogous to that of the net-cost regressions in Table 2 . 17 The estimates indicate that the recoveryto-asset ratio tends to rise over time. 18 The general upward trend in the average recovery-to-asset ratio over time can be seen by the comparison of means, which are shown at the bottom of the table. For example, the average recovery-to-asset ratio for all firms that failed at least four years ago is .16. This ratio rises to .22 if the sample includes only firms that failed at least six years ago. The ratio increases further to .28 if the sample of firms is reduced to only firms that failed at least eight years ago.
The overall upward trend, even in years 4 through 10, suggests that recoveries may continue to trickle in over time. To adjust for that fact, estimates of add-ons were produced for the earlier years since cumulative recoveries in these early years do not represent the final recovery values for these insolvencies. Given the number of data points and the lack of smoothness in the time paths, it is not possible to estimate with any confidence anything other than a linear trend. To make the adjustment, the recovery data for years 4 through 10 are first regressed on a constant and a linear time trend. This produces a predicted time path for the recovery-to-asset ratio, which rises over time. That time path, benchmarked against Year 10, is then used to produce implied add-on factors for the earlier years. This was done separately for both the full sample and the cross-sectional sample. For example, in the full sample, the linear time path implies that the cumulative recovery-to-asset ratio in Year 5 is about onethird the size of cumulative recoveries in Year 10. Therefore, to make the adjustment, the recovery-to-asset ratios in Year 5 are all multiplied by three.
The results of the recovery regressions after the recoveries have been adjusted (with add-ons) are shown in the second column of Table 3 . Because of the detrending, the recovery-to-asset ratios now do not rise over time. The key result, however, is that the mean of the recovery-to-asset ratios, shown at the bottom of the table, indicates that recoveries are only 33 percent of pre-insolvency assets. This is not surprising given that, if one examines only insolvencies that occurred ten years ago, cumulative recoveries average only 28 percent of pre-insolvency assets. Data limitations preclude checking to see whether recoveries continue to grow significantly in time periods beyond ten years. However, it seems unlikely that there are more than a trickle of recoveries for insolvencies beyond ten years.
19 Either way, the result that cumulative recoveries average only about 33 percent of assets, at least through ten years, is striking. Recovery rates change when expressed as a percentage of invested assets ("hard assets" such as cash, stocks, and bonds) rather than total assets (which include hard assets as well as agent balances and other noninvested assets). To explore this issue, analogous regressions are run with total assets replaced by invested assets. The results, shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 3 , show that the recovery rates rise as expected. The recovery rate rises from 33 percent to 41 percent, which is a significant, 25 percent increase. However, a 41 percent recovery rate is still low in absolute terms, suggesting that recovery rate for invested assets is also strikingly low.
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Payments
To determine the magnitude of guaranty fund payments, the cumulative paymentto-asset ratios are regressed on time dummies in a manner similar to the net-cost and recovery regressions. The results are reported in the last column of Table 3 . With the exception of the first few years, there is no upward trend in the means over time.
After Year 3, the numbers fluctuate around 1.5 or so with a fairly large range. For consistency with earlier tables, the mean of the ratios for years 4 through 10 are reported in the bottom rows. The analysis suggests that there is about $1.40 worth of payments for every $1.00 of assets on average. To the extent that some of the cumulative payments in the earlier years are incomplete, this $1.40 figure represents an underestimate of the true ratio of (fully realized) payments to assets. However, the lack of any general upward trend, at least for years 4 through 10, makes any upward adjustment questionable, and so it was not done.
Analysis
In an earlier work, Bohn and Hall (1998) speculated that the high cost of insurance company insolvencies was driven by liability rather than asset problems. Given the relative riskiness of P&C insurance company assets relative to their liabilities, it seemed reasonable to suspect that, to a first approximation, insurance company failures were driven by liability increases. These results do not support that contention. Although guaranty fund payments are indeed high-approximately $1.40 per $1.00 of assetsthe more surprising result is that recoveries are so low. Liquidators turn over only about one-third of the pre-insolvency (book) value of assets. This suggests that an important element in understanding why the cost of insurance company failures is so high involves analyzing why liquidators turn over so little money to the guaranty funds. This issue is addressed in the next section.
RECOVERIES AND REGULATION
The low rate of recoveries suggests regulatory failure of some sort. An important 20 The results were also rerun without the CPI adjustment. Because recoveries come in many years after an insolvency, recoveries are deflated by more than assets. When such an adjustment is made (not shown in the table), the recovery rate increases by 19 percent (or 6 percentage points), from 33 percent to 39 percent. However, the CPI adjustment seems reasonable. Indeed, since most of the assets are invested assets, which collect interest over time, a case can be made for deflating everything by the interest rate rather than the inflation rate, which would make the recovery rate lower instead of higher. In this respect, the CPI adjustment is a conservative one, which seems prudent given the findings in this study.
question, therefore, is whether various factors that are thought to improve the stringency of state regulation are associated with better recovery performance. Thus, in this section, the author investigates whether various characteristics of state regulatory regimes are correlated with a high or a low rate of recoveries. In Table 4 , the recovery rate, defined as before as cumulative recoveries divided by assets, is regressed on a constant, a year indicator (i.e., a linear time path), and various regulatory variables, defined below. As a check for robustness, because the year indicator imposes a linear trend on the time profile of recoveries, a less restrictive specification is used that replaces the year indicator with year dummies. In addition, the specification is run with and without a control for mutual firms (equals 1 if the firm is a mutual rather than a stock firm).
The first two regulatory variables are meant to capture the amount of resources, appropriately scaled, that a state puts into regulation. The two proxies for "amount of resources" are the total budget of the state insurance office and the total number of state insurance examiners, both scaled by the dollar value of direct premiums written in the state. The variables were scaled by premiums rather than number of insurance companies because the average size of insurance companies can differ dramatically by state. The third regulatory variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurance company is domiciled in one of the ten largest states, measured by population. 21 This variable is meant to capture any economies of scale in regulation. Some industry experts believe that larger states generally do a better job of regulating insurance companies than smaller states. Fourth, a regulatory variable is included to capture differences in the corporate governance structure of the state insurance offices; a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state insurance commissioner is elected rather than appointed is included in the regression. Some argue that elected regulators do a better job than appointed ones since the former are more accountable than the latter. Finally, a dummy variable is included if the state allows guaranty fund assessments to be offset against taxes. To the extent that state regulators are made accountable to taxpayers, a tax offset would give regulators an incentive to be efficient in resolving insolvencies.
The results, with each of the five regulation variables included sequentially in the specifications, are shown in Table 4 . Although one could discuss interpretations of the variables that are different from the ones offered above, such discussion seems unnecessary. The striking fact that comes from this table is that, with two minor exceptions, none of the coefficients are statistically significant. The coefficient on large states is negative and significant, implying that large states have a worse recovery record (the opposite of the predicted result), but this result is a fragile one because it is not significant in the second specification. The tax offset variable is also negative and significant, which is evidence against the view that taxpayers are successful in raising recovery rates. Indeed, taken at face value, the results suggest the opposite. One interpretation of this result is that regulators are responding to pressure from insurance companies and policyholders (who would push for better handling of insolvencies when there is no tax offset) rather than taxpayers.
The more important conclusion of this analysis, however, is the more general low correlation between the regulatory variables and the recovery performance. These results should be interpreted with some caution. For example, this low correlation may be explained by lack of discretion of the regulators (e.g., the regulators are restricted to choose liquidators from an NAIC approved list). Alternatively, the low correlation could be the result of a low statistical power of the tests. Nevertheless, taken at face value, the results suggest that low average rate of recoveries is pervasive in that it is relatively independent of regulatory resources and regulatory regime.
EX ANTE OR EX POST REGULATORY FAILURE
The pervasively low rate of recoveries could be the result of poor ex ante regulation or poor ex post regulation. Put another way, the low recovery rate could reflect the fact that insufficiently stringent regulation enables companies (that subsequently fail) to hold assets with greatly inflated values. In this case, even with a very efficient liquidation process, recoveries would be expected to be low. This is the case of poor ex ante regulation.
Conversely, the problem may lie in the liquidation process. In particular, when liquidators begin to sell off the assets, they first pay their own expenses (and the expenses of lawyers and other subcontracted groups involved in the liquidation process) before turning over the money to the guaranty funds. Thus, the incentives for liquidators to keep liquidation costs low are not strong. Indeed, incentives exist for those profiting from the liquidation process to extend the process for as long as possible. This is the case of poor ex post regulation-the regulatory version of Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory, whereby cash-rich regulators, like cash-rich managers, are not eager to part with money.
Tests
To distinguish between these two hypotheses-poor ex ante and poor ex post regulation-the recovery rate is regressed on a series of pre-insolvency balance sheet variables. If there is poor ex ante regulation, then various balance sheet variables are likely to be correlated with subsequent recovery rates. For example, if recoveries are low because lax regulation enables insurance companies to hold inflated assets, then a (good) proxy for low asset quality will be correlated with low recoveries, suggesting that at least some of the low recoveries are the result of poor ex ante regulation. Conversely, if asset quality is uncorrelated with recoveries, then poor ex post regulation is the likely culprit.
In Tables 5 and 6 , recovery rates are regressed, sequentially, on seven balance sheet variables using the same basic specifications as before. The first variable is the fraction of assets that are "hard assets," where hard assets are defined as invested assets (cash, Treasury bills, etc.), bonds, and stocks. 22 The fraction of assets in real estate, the second balance sheet variable, is included because liquidators may have trouble selling risky real-estate assets. The third and fourth variables are the proportion of reinsurer receivables and agent balances. Distressed companies often fail because of problems with receivables from agents and reinsures, making it difficult for liquidators to collect on these assets. 1 Bond quality is the proportion of total bonds that are industrial, all measured at book value. The results were similar for alternative definitions of bond quality (e.g., adding utility bonds, using market value, etc.).
The fifth balance sheet variable (shown in Table 6 ) is the capital-to-asset ratio. The relationship between pre-insolvency capital and recoveries should be, if anything, positive. But this relationship is likely to be small in magnitude since guaranty funds have a higher priority than most creditors do in the distribution of funds from the liquidation proceedings (the exception being that they must pay all taxes due and some wages due, which are probably small), breaking most of the links between a firm's pre-insolvency capital position and the distribution of recoveries to guaranty funds.
The sixth balance sheet variable is a proxy for bond risk-the proportion of bonds that are industrial, measured at book value. 23 The final balance sheet variable is fast premium growth, a dummy variable equal to 1 if premium growth in the year before failure is greater than 25 percent. Best's Insolvency Study (1991) lists this variable as a potential indicator of excessively risky behavior. In addition, Bohn and Hall (1996) provide evidence that insurance companies may "game" the guaranty fund system through fast premium growth. To the extent that fast premium growth indicates that companies are gaming the system, this may imply that they are also gaming in other ways, such as by holding risky assets. Thus, fast premium growth may capture some of the effects of poor asset quality not captured by "hard assets," which is likely to be an imperfect proxy for asset quality. The fast premium growth variable is also interacted with premium growth to see whether there is a positive relationship between premium growth and recovery rates for the potential gamers. In addition, mutual and size dummies 24 are added as control variables.
The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6 . Two of the balance sheet variables are significant. The percentage of hard assets is positive and statistically significant at conventional confidence levels, although its statistical significance falls off in the second specification. Moreover, the point estimates imply an effect that is nontrivial. For example, using Specification 1 and assuming a basically fully realized insolvency (i.e., one that occurred ten years ago 25 ), the coefficient on hard assets implies that moving from an average fraction of hard assets (.60 in this sample) to a very high level (.90, which is .10 above the industry average of .80) increases the recovery rate from 37 percent to 45 percent. The coefficients on the next five balance sheet variables are all insignificant, although several (real estate, agent balances, and bond quality) have the predicted sign. Note that the coefficient on the capital-to-asset ratio is negative, the opposite of the expected sign, but is not even close to being significant. The lack of a link between the pre-insolvency capital surplus and subsequent recoveries is probably not surprising given that creditors have a lower priority in the distribution process than the guaranty fund.
The coefficient on fast premium growth is negative and statistically significant in all specifications; thus, potential gamers, companies with fast premium growth, have a lower recovery rate on average. The interaction term, however, is insignificant, suggesting no difference between the high-growth gamers and the very high-growth gamers. Using the point estimates in Specification 5 and the same assumptions as above, nongaming firms have an average recovery rate of 41 percent, while gamers have a recovery rate of only 27 percent, suggesting a nontrivial difference between the two types of firms.
Analysis
The basic conclusion of these results, therefore, is that the recovery rate is influenced by the quality of pre-insolvency assets and by a proxy for "gaming." The fact that a correlation exists between these balance sheet items and recovery rates suggests that at least some of the low recovery problem can be explained by the poor financial condition of the firm before the liquidation process. Thus some support exists for the poor ex ante regulation hypothesis.
However, poor ex ante regulation does not preclude poor ex post regulation. The low recovery rate may be caused by both poor asset quality and by inefficiencies (or worse) in the liquidation process. The method used to investigate this possibility is to estimate the "predicted" recovery rate of a nongaming firm with a very high percentage of hard assets. If companies with high-quality assets (defined to be nongaming com- 24 Firms are put into quartiles by asset size. Thus, there are four dummies (one dropped).
They are only occasionally statistically significant but are included as a robustness check. 25 This necessitates multiplying the year indicator by 6 since the year indicator equals the number of years ago that the company was liquidated minus 4 .
panies with a high percentage of hard assets) also have low recovery rates, then this suggests that the liquidation process has eaten up much of the assets. However, if companies with high-quality assets also have high recovery rates, this suggests that virtually all of the problem of low recovery rates stems from poor ex ante regulation-that is, the poor asset quality of the companies. Table 7 shows the results of specifications that include both hard assets and fast premium growth as right-side variables. The coefficients on both variables are statistically significant in each specification. In addition, the coefficients seem fairly stable across specifications. The estimates of the coefficients do not imply that a nongaming company with a high percentage of hard assets has a high recovery rate. For example, the coefficients in Specification 1 imply that a ten-year-old insolvency of a nongaming company (the fast premium growth dummy is set to zero) has a recovery rate of 42 percent if the hard assets are set at 80 percent, which is approximately the P&C industry average. Under the same assumptions, moving the percentage of hard assets to 90 percent implies a recovery rate of only 45 percent. Even taking the polar case whereby all assets are hard assets implies a recovery rate of only 48 percent. The fact that even a (hypothetical) nongaming company with 100 percent hard assets produces low recovery rates suggests that a problematic liquidation process is at least part of the story. The specification used to do this analysis does not include mutual as a control variable. As shown in Specification 3, mutual is significant and positive. Thus, it seems reasonable to do the same analysis with Specification 3 to determine the predicted recovery rate of a nongaming mutual with a high percentage of assets. There are two reasons to believe that a financially sound mutual is not the appropriate benchmark. First, although the coefficient on mutual is large and statistically significant, only eight mutuals are in the sample. Second and more important, as will be shown in the next section, mutuals have higher payments as well as higher recoveries. In fact, the coefficients suggest an implausibly high rate of payments for mutuals. Taken at face value, this suggests that mutuals are more expensive to resolve (on net), making them not a very good candidate for a benchmark "best financial condition company." No obvious explanation exists for the high rate of recoveries and payments for mutuals. Nevertheless, if one ignores these caveats and sets mutual equal to 1 (in Specification 3, for example), the recovery rate of a firm with 80 percent hard assets is still only 64 percent. Moreover, the recovery rate rises to only 70 percent under the extreme assumption of 100 percent hard assets.
The bottom line of this analysis is that liquidations of firms that appear to have a high proportion of hard assets do not generally lead to high recovery rates. The possibility remains, nevertheless, that even these hard assets do not have market values anywhere close to their pre-insolvency book rates. That is, ex ante regulatory failure alone explains the low recovery rates. But this story would seem to require large, widespread overvaluation of even hard asset values. This would only be possible with widespread, fraudulent reporting of such values.
Although this may explain some of the low recovery rates, it seems likely that a significant factor contributing to the low recovery rates is the reluctance of liquidators to turn over the proceeds from the asset sales. Although data on liquidation expenses could not be obtained (information on liquidation expenses are sometimes "filed under seal" by the courts, and the regulators and receivership offices the author contacted refused to disclose the data), individuals familiar with the process believe that liquidation expenses are sometimes quite high. As just one example, Macleod (1998) investigated the Transit insolvency and found that two and one-half years after the company went into liquidation, the liquidators had "actually spent more administering the estate than it had distributed to its creditors" (Macleod, p. 47). His report details the very high expenses and incomes of the liquidators; the cronyism among the politicians, the judge, and the liquidators; and payments of "$33.8 million to more than 150 law firms since 1985." This pattern of activity is consistent with the "free cash flow" view of the regulatory process.
PAYMENTS
This article focuses on the magnitude of asset recoveries and the reasons for the low recovery rate. It is also interesting, however, to examine the other side of the balance sheet by investigating the reasons for the relatively high guaranty fund payment rate, which was established earlier to be on the order of 1.4. Why are payment rates so high? Do any of the regulatory or balance-sheet variables help to explain the high payment rate?
Specifications were estimated that regressed the payment rate on the same regulatory variables as before and on two balance sheet variables. The balance sheet variables include fast premium growth-since these gaming firms might be expected to lead to higher payments-and the percentage of premiums in long-tail lines-since evidence in Bohn and Hall (1999) suggests that movement into long-tail lines is one way that firms can game the guaranty fund system. Two control variables are also included, mutual and disaster [equals 1 if the firm failed because of a natural disaster according to A.M. Best Company (1991)].
The results (not reported) indicate that none of the regulatory variables are statistically significant, suggesting that the high rate of payments is invariant to regulatory regime and regulatory resources. In addition, the lack of connection between the balance-sheet variables and the payment rate suggests that, to the extent that such gameplaying exists, it does not seem to correlate necessarily with higher guaranty fund payments, at least relative to the nongamers. Some caution must be taken in interpreting these results. With only 71 observations of noisy payment data, it may be too hard to tease out correlations with these variables. Nevertheless, taken at face value, the evidence suggests that the relatively high payment rate is invariant to regulatory regime.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of this article have some policy implications. The extremely high cost of insolvencies raises the issue of the capacity of the solvency funds should there be one or more large insurance company failures in a state. A 1992 GAO report (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992) warned that the capacity of 33 to 38 state funds would be outstripped if a large P&C company failed. The findings of this GAO study have been challenged on the grounds that the assumptions are exaggerated and the methodology is flawed. 26 Although these criticisms are at least somewhat valid, the analysis and findings in this article suggest, at a minimum, that the GAO's warnings should be taken seriously.
The high cost of failures also suggests regulatory failure of some sort. But, interestingly, there is a striking lack of any correlation between the regulatory variables and outcomes (recovery rates and payment rates). Although this result should be interpreted with some caution, it does seem to indicate that the poor outcomes are pervasive and invariant to regulatory regime and regulatory resources. On this view, small changes in regulatory budgets or minor changes in governance structures (e.g., electing rather than appointing insurance commissioners) are not likely to matter very much.
Perhaps the most striking finding of this article is that recoveries are so low. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the weak incentives for liquidators to turn over money to guaranty funds. In the liquidation proceedings, liquidators pay their own expenses first from the funds generated by the asset sales. Thus, there seems to be little incentive for them to sell off the assets in a revenue-maximizing way, and there is little incentive to turn over these funds once they have sold off the assets. Indeed, since well-paid lawyers are often hired to facilitate the liquidation process, they have every incentive to prolong it as much as possible. On this regulatory free cash flow view, regulatory failure is the result of a classic agency problem. The regulators have better information than the principals (taxpayers, policyholders, and insurance companies, since they ultimately bear the cost of assessments) and the incentives of the agent-regulators are not lined up well with the goals of the principals. Real reform, therefore, requires both improved information and a closer alignment of regulator incentives and principal goals.
Modest reforms include changing the liquidation process (so that the liquidators no longer have first priority) and improving the information that liquidators must provide about their performance and expenses. A more radical reform would be to narrow the range of groups who bear the cost of insolvencies (e.g., removing the tax offset so that the industry bears most of the incidence of assessment taxes), 27 while simultaneously combining the liquidation and claim-paying responsibilities into one group (the agents) who are funded by, and made accountable to, the industry (the principals). This is all complicated by potential conflicts of interest related to the fact that the regulators also regulate the industry in other ways (e.g., rate setting). Nevertheless, the guiding principle of regulatory reform is that the agent-regulators should be a clearly defined group made accountable to a nondiffuse group of principalsthose who bear the cost of insolvencies.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A sharp increase in P&C insurance company insolvencies has occurred during the past decade. The number of insolvencies increased from about ten per year between 1970 and 1985 to more than 30 per year during the past decade. From 1993 to 1995, about the same number of P&C insurance companies failed as commercial banks, even though the total number of commercial banks outnumbers the total number of P&C insurance companies by a factor of four to one.
Evidence in this article suggests that it is very costly to resolve these insurance company failures. The ratio of net resolution costs to pre-insolvency assets is approximately 1:2, which is approximately four times larger than comparable estimates for banks and S&Ls. Much of the high cost of failures reflects large policyholder losses, which lead to high claims against the estate of the insolvent firm. However, the more surprising result is that much of the explanation for the high cost of insolvencies is the low recovery rate by the liquidators. On average, liquidators turn over only 33 cents for every $1.00 of pre-insolvency assets.
The evidence suggests that this low recovery rate reflects a combination of two factors. The first is that the assets are of poor quality, suggesting regulatory breakdown before the liquidation proceedings. The second is that the liquidation process is flawed. Liquidators, who pay their own expenses out of proceeds first, are less than eager to turn over the funds generated from asset sales to the state guaranty funds. Just as agency considerations lead cash-rich managers to find creative ways to spend money, agency considerations may lead regulator-liquidators to find creative ways to spend the proceeds of asset sales. More direct evidence is needed to determine how important this regulatory free cash flow effect is. Assuming that the effect is large, more research is needed to understand how, in practice, liquidators (and the state agencies that oversee them) manage to take such a large bite out of the pie.
Extensions to this article have the potential to lead to more general theories about regulatory behavior. 28 If regulatory free cash flow effects are important, then regula- 27 The author is arguing that narrowing the group that pays assessment taxes is efficient (because free riding prevents a diffuse group from having the incentives to keep insolvency costs low) but not necessarily fair. Indeed, the argument that it is unfair for responsible insurance companies to pay the bill for their irresponsible competitors has merit. 28 This article could also lead to theories about the behavior of nonregulatory agencies of the government.
tory inefficiency should increase, ceteris paribus, as regulatory free cash flow increases. Although asset sales are one way to generate cash flow for regulators, there are others. Some regulatory agencies collect tolls and fees. 29 Are these regulatory agencies plagued by free cash flow problems? Evidence about this issue could make an important contribution to our understanding of regulatory behavior.
